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BOILERPLATE  AND  CONSENT  
Nancy S. Kim† 
N MARGARET JANE RADIN’S BOOK, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law, Radin argues that boiler-
plate is a social problem leading to normative and democratic 
degradation of important rights. Although practitioners typi-
cally refer to “boilerplate” as the miscellaneous, standardized provi-
sions at the end of a contract, Radin uses the term to refer to “stand-
ardized form contracts” which “like the rigid metal used to construct 
steam boilers in the past . . . cannot be altered.”1 Radin proposes an 
analytical framework for evaluating boilerplate and a bold panoply 
of alternatives to contract law to deal with the problem of boiler-
plate which includes private and public approaches, and a novel use 
of tort law to deter the most egregious rights-deleting terms.2  
In his review of Radin’s book, Omri Ben-Shahar outlines two 
approaches to regulation by boilerplate.3 He labels the first as “au-
tonomism,” which asks “how such one-sided dictation of terms by 
firms fits within a liberal account of good social order, of democratic 
                                                                                                 
† Nancy Kim is a Professor of Law at California Western School of Law and the author of WRAP 
CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (Oxford 2013). © Nancy S. Kim, 2014. 
1 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW (2013) at 8-9. 
2 Id. at 154-242. 
3 Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, available at papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255161t 2 (forthcoming, Michigan Law 
Review, 2013). 
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control and participation, and of individual autonomy.” Ben-Shahar 
views Radin as representative of the autonomists. The second way 
of viewing regulation-by-boilerplate is “to ask how it affects the well 
being and satisfaction of consumers who buy products co-packed 
with boilerplate.” Ben-Shahar identifies himself with “boilerplate 
apologists,” who are primarily concerned with “the substance of the 
deal, its costs to consumers, the ease by which profitable deals are 
formed, and the opportunities to realize benefits from trade” and 
who are “largely numb to the inherent political value of private or-
der, control, or ‘voice.’”  
Ben-Shahar sets up the two camps in order to frame his critique. 
But what he purports to accept as “the autonomists’ premise” – that 
there is “something offensive about being bound to terms that you 
did not know about” – is a belittling mischaracterization. Radin ar-
gues that some boilerplate strips consumers of important rights and 
is socially harmful, not that it is “offensive.” By downgrading the 
harm engendered by boilerplate from a rights violation to something 
akin to elbows on the table, he dismisses Radin’s premise at the 
same time that he purports to accept it. Ben-Shahar then reframes 
the discussion as one about the economics of boilerplate instead of 
Radin’s concern, which is the deletion of rights without consent, 
and the deletion of rights which are market-inalienable or partially 
market-inalienable. 
According to Ben-Shahar, boilerplate apologists believe that 
boilerplate is welfare-enhancing because it reduces transaction costs 
and, presumably, prices. Therefore, he argues, boilerplate is what 
consumers want anyway – a generalization that Radin disputes.4 
More importantly, it ignores the larger questions raised by Radin’s 
book regarding the limits of consent: Even assuming that consumers 
want boilerplate, how much does that matter? Or, to put it differ-
ently, Are there limits to consent? Are there some things to which 
we, as a civilized society, should not permit consumers to consent?  
This Essay does not attempt to answer those questions. Rather, it 
posits that they are unanswerable without a better, more nuanced 
                                                                                                 
4 Radin devotes the entirety of chapter 6 to this issue. See Radin at 99-109. 
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definition of consent – one that takes into account contracting reali-
ties such as contracting environment, contract presentment, the 
nature of rights affected, and the burdens created by boilerplate. 
I.  INFORMATION  AND  CONSENT  
onsent justifies judicial intervention into what is otherwise a 
private affair. Without consent, state enforcement of contracts 
amounts to state coercion. The central problem with regulation by 
boilerplate is consent and the importance of certain rights that 
should not be so easily waivable – or waivable at all. Radin cares 
about consent. She also cares about the varieties of nonconsent. One 
of those varieties, in addition to coercion and fraud, is sheer igno-
rance. There can be no consent – or there can only be nonconsent – 
where there is coercion, fraud, or sheer ignorance. In the context of 
boilerplate, it is sheer ignorance that rears its ugly head most often. 
Radin states that sheer ignorance occurs “where a person’s entitle-
ment is being divested, but the person does not know that it is hap-
pening, or indeed, that anything is happening.”5 Sheer ignorance is 
characterized by an absence of information, and without information 
a consumer cannot consent. As Radin notes, “for a consumer to make 
a free choice, that consumer must have some level of information.”6 
Another category of consent that Radin refers to, “problematic 
consent,” results from decisionmaking impediments that prevent an 
informed choice. In this situation, such as where a user clicks “I 
agree” to the terms of use without reading them, she questions the 
validity of the consent.7 Information asymmetry, which refers to 
recipients of boilerplate having much less information than do the 
firms that draft them, makes consent problematic.8 In addition, heu-
ristic bias, which refers to the cognitive limitations or “bounded ra-
tionality” of human beings, impedes decisionmaking and renders 
                                                                                                 
5 Id. at 21. 
6 Id. at 103. 
7 Id. at 24. 
8 Id. at 24-25. 
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consent problematic.9 Radin references the body of academic re-
search and empirical studies that find that human beings are myopic 
and less than perfectly rational.10  
The existence of heuristic biases casts doubt on the possibility of 
informed consent, which depends upon the consenter’s ability to 
understand and assess risk. Radin argues that the fact that individuals 
only at best pay attention to whatever seems salient to them at the 
moment also means that certain rights that do not seem salient to 
individuals – such as viable rights to redress of grievances – should 
not be waivable on an individual-by-individual basis. 
Ben-Shahar presents what he refers to as two myths pertaining to 
boilerplate and sheer ignorance. The first myth is that “boilerplate is 
more complex” than a simple agreement from a pre-boilerplate era. 
Because such a simple agreement does not address many of the issues 
addressed by boilerplate, it is subject to other legal sources such as 
default rules, gap fillers, regulations, and local customers and market 
norms. Thus, Ben-Shahar argues, the complexity of the simple 
agreement “is probably greater, compared to boilerplate, because 
the absence of a comprehensive sheet of terms opens the door for 
various and overlapping supplementary sources.”11  
But complexity by itself is not the problem; complexity is prob-
lematic when it obscures important information relevant to a party’s 
decision. It vitiates consent when the party would have made a dif-
ferent decision if the party had known of the information. What 
Ben-Shahar describes as the “complexity” of “supplementary 
sources” such as default rules and norms is not necessarily a problem 
for the non-drafting party because unlike boilerplate, supplementary 
sources are typically crafted to reflect the intent of reasonable par-
ties in similar situations. Boilerplate, on the other hand, tends to 
favor the drafter and probably does not reflect the intent of the non-
drafting party. Complexity matters to the nondrafting party if the 
information that it contains harms her. It is irrelevant if it says what 
                                                                                                 
9 Id. at 26. 
10 Id. at 26-27. 
11 Ben-Shahar at 5. 
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she intends. Furthermore, as Radin argues, default rules represent 
the past choices of legislatures and courts, and so at least have some 
democratic basis.  
The second myth, according to Ben-Shahar, is that “boilerplate can 
be replaced with informed consent.” According to Ben-Shahar, this 
is a myth because it is “the complexity of the decision that under-
mines the project of informed consent, not some technical failure in 
the delivery template of the disclosure.” But in many cases, it is the 
failure of the delivery template. Research shows that the nature of 
disclosure matters a great deal in educating consumers. As Archon 
Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil argue, “targeted transparency 
policies succeed when they are user-centered.”12 For example, the star 
rating system used to indicate the safety of sport utility vehicles 
(SUVs) successfully educated consumers and led to safer SUV mod-
els.13 The disclosure system was effective both because the infor-
mation was clearly communicated and the format was user-centered 
and allowed easy comparisons among different auto makers.14 
When critics of disclosure like Ben-Shahar argue that it doesn’t 
“work,” what they really mean is that consumers fail to act differently 
as a result of the disclosure. But as Fung, Graham, and Weil demon-
strate, it is only some disclosure that doesn’t work.  
Furthermore, consumer inaction stems from a variety of complex 
causes, including heuristic biases. Collective action and coordination 
problems also impede action. A lack of reasonable alternatives pre-
sents yet another obstacle for the consumer. Ben-Shahar assumes 
competitive markets but as Radin notes, we cannot simply make 
that assumption nor can we assume that, even given a competitive 
market, we have not reached a “lemons equilibrium” where firms 
compete “by offering their worst contract, not their best.”15  
 
                                                                                                 
12 ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM AND DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS 
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007). 
13 Id. at 1-4. 
14 Id. at 2-3. 
15 See Radin at 109. 
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Alternatives result from market competition and market compe-
tition arises from demand. This is how the issue of consumer choice 
is affected by lack of transparency or ineffective disclosure. As Radin 
argues, “Appropriate market functioning depends upon an acceptable 
understanding of the basis of demand. A market is not functioning 
properly if demand is based on completely erroneous notions about 
what the product is.”16 If consumers don’t know about a harm, they 
won’t complain about it or demand alternatives, and there will be 
no market response to address that demand for alternatives. Effective 
disclosure, however, has the potential to raise awareness and create 
competition in the marketplace, such as with the star rating system 
mentioned above, which made rollover safety a salient consumer 
issue and, eventually, a competitive product feature.17 
Disclosure won’t solve every instance of non-consent or prob-
lematic consent, but to dismiss it out of hand is an overreaction. 
Boilerplate is easy to ignore because it is hard to find and harder to 
understand. Would consumers care about arbitration if they had the 
right kind of information, such as “From 2010-2013, 200 consumers 
tried to sue us but were forced to arbitrate their claims. Of those 
claims, consumers prevailed on only 2 out of 200.”? Maybe some 
would, maybe some wouldn’t. Less probable is that they would 
purchase goods from a website if they knew its terms of use con-
tained the following provision: 
You agree not to file or initiate any complaint, chargeback, dis-
pute, public comment, forum post, website post, social media 
post, or any claim related to any transaction with our website 
and/or company. By using our website, making any purchase, 
or conducting any transaction with us, you agree to all terms 
and conditions stated herein. Any action in breach of this 
                                                                                                 
16 Id. at 103. 
17 Fung, Graham and Weil at 4 (noting that “SUV models had widely varying rollo-
ver rates – and most performed poorly. In 2001, thirty models received only one 
or two stars, meaning that they had a greater than 30 percent chance of rolling 
over, while only one model . . . . earned a four-star rating, meaning that it had a 
less than 20 percent chance of rolling over. By 2005, however, only one model 
. . . . received as few as two stars, while twenty-four models earned four stars.”) 
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agreement that causes reversal of any payment in full or in part 
shall result in a collections action for the full or partial order to-
tal (the amount reversed) plus an additional $50. You agree 
that any breach of this agreement shall also constitute liability in 
the amount of $200 plus any related costs directly or indirectly 
relating from any such breach.18 
Consumers don’t read boilerplate now, but that doesn’t mean 
they won’t read any boilerplate in any form, ever. Ben-Shahar’s 
claim of ineffectiveness merely absolves businesses of responsibility 
for the lousy job they are currently doing with conveying infor-
mation. To ignore or discount the potential of disclosure to remedy 
informational asymmetries devalues the importance of consent. Dis-
closure requirements signalize that the quality of consent matters. 
Even if an individual consumer fails to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to review relevant information, it should not be up to the 
drafting company to make the decision that the consumer will not do 
so – and so not even bother to try to make the information readable. 
If the vast majority of consumers ignore certain information, 
there are two possibilities. Either the information is immaterial or 
that information is not presented in a reasonable manner. Else-
where, I have proposed that the courts adopt a “duty to draft rea-
sonably.”19 Under the duty to draft reasonably, contract provisions 
would be categorized based upon their function (shield, sword or 
crook), with the taxonomy determining what type of information 
should be disclosed and how consent should be manifested.20 If the 
                                                                                                 
18 Terms of Use from Accessory Town, available at acctown.com/pages/terms. 
19 NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013) at 
176-192. 
20 Id. at 44-52. “Shield” terms protect the company’s proprietary interests and do 
not require the consumer’s consent. A business can, for example, unilaterally 
limit the scope of a license term, forbid smoking in hotel rooms, and prohibit 
bullying on its website. By contrast, “sword” provisions diminish consumers’ 
rights, such as the right to sue, or impose obligations, such as the obligation to pay 
fees in addition to the purchase price. Consequently, they require the consumer’s 
consent. The last category of terms, “crook” provisions, are terms that are not 
obviously part of the bargain. Examples of crook provisions include terms that 
claim a broad license to use personal information even though the website boasts 
Nancy  S.  Kim  
300   17  GREEN  BAG  2D  
vast majority of consumers fail to read important information, the 
company has failed to meet the standard. Companies conduct focus 
group testing as part of their marketing efforts – they should put 
some of that skill and knowledge into testing the noticeability and 
comprehensibility of their contract terms.  
II.  TRANSPARENCY,  CHOICE  AND  COMPETITION  
adin’s proposed analytical framework consists of evaluating (i) 
the nature of the right to determine whether it is one that is 
alienable or whether it is market-inalienable; (ii) the quality of con-
sent by the recipient; and (iii) where relevant, the extent of social 
dissemination of the rights deletion.21 She proposes that “either non-
consent or market-inalienability will invalidate any purported con-
tract, whether mass-market or not, whether boilerplate or not.”22  
Ben-Shahar warns against the unintended consequences of Ra-
din’s proposal. The first such unintended consequence is the “price 
effect,” which is basically the effect that boilerplate deletion will 
have upon the price consumers will be expected to pay. His assump-
tion is that better terms will result in higher prices. Yet, there is no 
evidence to support that any cost savings from the use of boilerplate 
are passed on to consumers instead of pocketed by the company. It 
is a common assumption made by apologists, which Radin observes 
is “not validated in practice to any significant extent” and which 
demonstrates a “breathtaking coup of armchair economics.”23  
Ben-Shahar argues that people have varying preferences for legal 
rights. Some may sell their rights cheaply, others at a greater dis-
count, and a few not at all. He argues that market-inalienability 
would prevent firms from price differentiating to reflect these pref-
erences. But most vendors do not now price differentiate based up-
                                                                                                 
that its services are “free and always will be.” See www.facebook.com/. A duty to 
draft reasonably would seek specific assent to sword and crook provisions but 
require only notice of shield provisions. 
21 Radin at 155. 
22 Id. at 159. 
23 Id. at 290-291, fn. 21. 
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on legal rights. Companies may offer variable pricing, but almost 
always it pertains to the product itself and not to ancillary legal 
rights. Furthermore, this argument does not respond to Radin’s 
central argument that some rights should not be saleable. 
According to Ben-Shahar, mandating certain terms would lead to 
regressive cross-subsidies. He uses as an example privacy policies, 
which he argues are a concern of the “sophisticated elite” but that 
most people could not afford the increased cost that would presum-
ably result if data collection were restricted or prohibited. But this 
claim is unfounded. In fact, it may be that the sophisticated elite are 
simply better informed about the consequences than the majority of 
consumers. Perhaps if the majority of consumers understood how 
their data was being collected and used, they would object (or be 
willing to pay more to do business with companies with less intru-
sive data collection policies). Will the collection of data mean that 
less wealthy consumers won’t be able to get a mortgage in the future? 
That they will be turned down for health insurance? That they won’t 
get the job they want? If it did, and consumers knew that it did, it 
would be safe to say that most consumers would care and that many 
would pay more to protect their information. The lack of transparen-
cy (What do companies do with our information anyway? What will 
they do with it in the future?) and heuristic biases make it hard to 
make generalizations about consumer preferences. In addition, Ben-
Shahar’s approach ignores the effect that greater transparency has on 
shaping public opinion. The majority of consumers may not be will-
ing to pay more for privacy now, but that doesn’t mean they won’t 
in the future if they understood how their information is used.  
Ben-Shahar presents a picture of consumers lining up outside of 
an Apple store the day the iPhone 5 was launched. He states that it 
is “not a picture of market failure, nor of gullible consumers divest-
ed of their rights.” But the fact that many consumers love the iPhone 
reveals nothing about Apple’s contract. If – as Ben-Shahar admits – 
few consumers read boilerplate, the number of people outside of 
Apple’s stores is not indicative of their feelings about Apple’s boil-
erplate. They don’t love Apple despite its boilerplate, they love Ap-
ple products without regard for its boilerplate.  
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Furthermore, what choice do these consumers have? Some might 
be willing to buy a Samsung Galaxy instead of an iPhone 5 if it had 
better boilerplate terms. The problem is that the Samsung Galaxy 
doesn’t have better boilerplate terms. There is no need for compa-
nies to compete on boilerplate because nobody knows what it says 
and everyone assumes that it says the same thing. 
CONCLUSION  
ccording to Ben-Shahar, “Radin’s argument poses two chal-
lenges for the boilerplate apologist”: 
The first challenge is the problem of ignorance – how can peo-
ple be obligated to terms that are impossible to know and ap-
preciate in advance? How could such terms match their prefer-
ences? The second challenge is the problem of intolerable terms 
– why should baseline legal entitlements be replaced with harsh 
one-sided arrangements? 
His arguments, however, answer another question: Is boilerplate 
socially beneficial? Rather than acknowledging the lack of alterna-
tives, the forced choices, and the judicial construction of consent, he 
discusses economic justifications for the reallocation of entitle-
ments. But he bases these justifications upon conjectures and, com-
pelling and insightful though they may be, they do not answer the 
question – Does consent matter all the time? Are there some rights 
that should not be saleable and if so, which ones? More importantly, 
who decides?  
Despite their differences, Radin and Ben-Shahar share a similar 
view of boilerplate – it is not a contract. A contract depends upon 
consent – this is not wishful thinking on the part of idealistic auton-
omists but the core tenet of contract law. The difference is that Ra-
din believes that it matters that boilerplate is not a contract and Ben-
Shahar does not. Ben-Shahar seems to adopt the view, So what if it is 
not a contract? For Ben-Shahar, the important question isn’t why 
boilerplate is contractual but whether it should nonetheless be en-
forced because it is socially beneficial. Ben-Shahar’s arguments in 
A 
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favor of boilerplate presume to know what the consumer would 
prefer rather than seeking ways to enable the individual to make 
better choices for herself.  
But a contract’s validity depends upon consent, not conjecture 
about what consumers would or should want. Without consent, 
boilerplate that reallocates rights is not a contract – it is a taking. 
The pervasiveness of boilerplate makes consent in the mass consum-
er context – actual consent, not legally constructed consent – fan-
tastical. Companies use fine print, legalese, and excess verbiage 
which render their contracts incomprehensible to most people (in-
cluding lawyers). There should be no “duty to read” without a “duty 
to draft reasonably.” The expectation that consumers read all the 
fine print thrust their way is unreasonable, especially when there is 
no similar expectation that businesses present and draft their con-
tracts so they are readable.  
Technology has exacerbated matters. Boilerplate insinuates itself 
on all of our digital devices. It comes between us and every compa-
ny we do business with online. These terms often incorporate hy-
perlinked pages by reference, creating a disruptive reading experi-
ence for consumers. To make matters worse, these terms often in-
corporate “modification at will” clauses which require consumers to 
read the terms each time they visit the website. The benefit of 
standard forms was supposed to be that they were efficient, but it is 
hardly efficient or rational for the consumer to read every contract 
she encounters online, every time she ventures online. The social 
cost would be overwhelming if consumers read every contract pre-
sented to them. So the consumer does what any rational actor 
would do – clicks “agree” without reading and surrender to the op-
pressive contracting environment. 
But companies are not the primary culprits here – they are 
merely exploiting the advantage that the courts have given them. 
Courts fail to consider how, in the aggregate, mass consumer con-
tracts create a coercive contracting environment. They construct 
assent through actions which are divorced from meaning or intent 
by the actor, such as clicking to remove an obstruction. If no one 
reads wrap contracts, how can courts find a “reasonable person” 
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would have done so? How can a definition of reasonable contracting 
behavior be so removed from the way people actually behave?  
The enforceability of boilerplate should depend first of all upon 
the quality of consent. Courts now construe consent as a conclusion 
– either the consumer did or did not consent to the contract. But 
consent is non-linear and, as Radin writes, occupies “a continuum 
from clear consent to clear nonconsent.”24 It is also scattershot, and 
variable. A consumer may consent to some things (the price, the 
return policy) but not others (the non-disparagement clause, the 
refund policies). Contract doctrine has always recognized this con-
tinuum through doctrines like unconscionability and mistake – but 
courts have sometimes been reluctant to apply them. The problems 
of boilerplate cannot be so easily divided into autonomist and con-
sequentialist silos given the limits of human cognition, and the prob-
lems with the current judicial construction of consent.  
The better question then is how to improve the quality of con-
sent? This can be done by making important information more sali-
ent by imposing a duty to draft reasonably along with a requirement 
of specific assent to provisions that reallocate rights or assign unallo-
cated rights. Increasing salience, both in terms of noticeability and 
relevance, through reasonable drafting is one way to improve the 
quality of consent. Noticeability and relevance can interrelate;25 as 
previously noted, making it easier for consumers to compare SUV 
rollovers made consumers care more about the issue of rollovers.  
Courts should also recognize that consent is less vital for some 
terms than for others. It doesn’t matter whether a shopper “con-
sents” to a store’s “NO SMOKING” policy – it’s within the store’s 
rights to impose it or eject the shopper. Similarly, it doesn’t matter 
whether Facebook’s users consent to its policy that users shall not 
                                                                                                 
24 Id. at 158. 
25 See, for example, OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACTS: LAW, ECONOMICS 
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012). Bar-Gill proposes disclosure 
requirements to help consumers make better decisions about cellphone contracts, 
mortgages and credit card contracts. 
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bully or post pornographic materials.26 Facebook can impose that 
conduct limitation without users’ consent.  
A proprietor’s rights, however, are not boundless. A consumer 
may consent to a store’s prominently displayed “NO RETURN ON 
SALE ITEMS” policy but not the provision buried in the notice that 
returns on all products are subject to a $20 restocking fee. A store-
owner has certain proprietorship rights with respect to her store or 
business, but other ownership rights are unclear or belong to the 
consumer. In some areas, the law is unclear about who owns rights, 
such as the right to personal information. Provisions affecting unallo-
cated rights, or reallocating rights, should require specific assent. A 
storeowner does not have the right to charge a $20 restocking fee 
without consent because that $20 belongs to the consumer. Similarly, 
Facebook’s users presumably own their personal data and it is unclear 
whether Facebook has the right to use it without user permission. 
Courts should replace the notion of blanket assent with specific 
assent and presumed assent requirements, depending on the nature 
of the provision. A specific assent requirement increases salience 
while a presumed assent requirement acknowledges that not all 
terms require consent. A more nuanced, specific assent/presumed 
assent analysis would render contracts more readable while more 
evenly balancing the benefits and burdens of boilerplate between the 
consumer and the drafting company. 
Radin’s book prompts another important question that the apolo-
gist response deflects and that is, Are there rights that are so fundamen-
tal to society that we should not allow individuals to waive them? While 
Ben-Shahar refers to Radin as an autonomist, her argument regard-
ing market inalienability is in fact a significant limitation on the abil-
ity of an individual to make decisions that affect legal rights affecting 
important societal values. The issue of inalienability forces us to ask, 
Are there certain rights that should not be subject to contract? Even with 
consent? And if so, how to determine which ones and, importantly, 
who should decide? These are important questions which require 
                                                                                                 
26 Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, available at www.facebook.com 
/legal/terms. 
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consideration of the long term consequences to society, not only the 
short term costs or benefits to individual consumers. Ben-Shahar’s 
response weighs the economic benefits of boilerplate, but does so 
without considering non-economic concerns. Yet social, political, 
behavioral, and economic issues are intertwined, and cost is a com-
plicated calculation that includes more than what’s listed on a price 
tag. Discussions about the benefit of economic policies should not 
occur in a vacuum if the objective is maximizing consumer welfare. 
A serious discussion about boilerplate’s effect on consumers 
must also consider the useful functions it serves for businesses and, 
by extension, society. U.S. contracts might compare unfavorably 
with those in more regulated, consumer-friendly countries, but then 
again, in many of those same countries, social norms and legislation 
limit a business’s potential liability for damages and restrict the abil-
ity to bring class-action lawsuits. The problem of boilerplate cannot 
be resolved without taking into account the liability that businesses 
might be asked to bear without it and the impact that such a burden 
might have on the economy and innovation. Given our litigious cul-
ture, I am not willing to throw the boilerplate baby out with the 
bathwater, however dirty it may be. Any regulation of boilerplate 
terms would have to consider limitations on companies’ liabilities 
and the possibility of consumer (or attorney) opportunism. Yet, the 
current judicial trend discounts too heavily opportunism by busi-
nesses in exploiting their contractual advantage.  
Although I can’t here answer the question of what rights should 
be inalienable (primarily because rendering rights inalienable re-
quires a case-by-case substantive inquiry), I believe the issue of mar-
ket inalienability is directly tied to the quality of consent: The better 
the quality of consent, the smaller the sphere of inalienability.27 Sim-
ilarly, the more inferior the quality of consent, the more protection 
required and the greater the sphere of market inalienability.  
                                                                                                 
27 In an ideal world, equally matched (resources, information, emotional well-
being) individuals with the same socio-political-economic status should be able to 
allocate their rights without intervention from the state. But we don’t live in a 
perfect world. 
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There are ways to enhance the quality of consent by making the 
process of contracting better and fairer. One way is to acknowledge 
contracting realities such as context and presentation. Judges should 
acknowledge their own experiences to admit that, Yes, they don’t 
read boilerplate either,28 and No, that doesn’t make them unreason-
able. The burden should not be upon the non-drafter to read a con-
tract that no “real” reasonable person would read.  
On the other hand, a failure to read should not excuse adherents 
from every obligation in every circumstance. In the context of 
standard form contracts, it may even be that whether an adherent 
consented is the wrong inquiry. Because of the all-or-nothing nature 
of assent, too much rides on the outcome of such an inquiry. A find-
ing of “consent” means that all terms are included; a finding of “no 
consent” means that no terms are included. Consent should not be 
required for every contractual provision, but for certain provisions 
consent should not be constructed or implied, but specifically and 
actually granted. 
While I continue to believe that contract law has the potential to 
address many of boilerplate’s ills, it is the judiciary that gives me 
pause. Cases like ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg29 bend doctrinal rules in 
favor of businesses, making consent more attenuated than when 
standard form contracts first made their efficient entrance. Too 
many courts have become enamored of apologist conjectures without 
regard to the coercive contracting environment faced by consumers. 
They consider the business and economic benefits of boilerplate 
without acknowledging the hardships to consumers. They ignore 
that there is so much more that businesses can do to make their con-
tracts more noticeable, more understandable and more reasonable. 
 
                                                                                                 
28Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals revealed that he didn’t 
read the hundreds of pages for his home equity loan before signing the contract. 
Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner Admits He Didn’t Read Boilerplate for Home Equity 
Loan, ABA JOURNAL, June 23, 2010, available at www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/judge_posner_admits_he_didnt_read_boilerplate_for_home_equity_loan/. 
29 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
